Tag Archives: NATO

Foreign Policy, Politics, Security, Strategy

A Rocky Return To Multilateralism

Retracing the most impactful events of the past year has become a December tradition for readers familiar with The Affiliate Network. In a year that started with a violent – and nearly successful – attempt to overturn a US Presidential election, and is ending with a military standoff that could draw NATO into combat against Russia, it would seem to be difficult to find much more to talk about…But 2021 has been special for all the wrong reasons. Two years following the COVID-19 outbreak, political turmoil lingers around the world. Latin America regressed two decades in terms of extreme poverty; and the fight against supply-chain bottlenecks continues to hinder commerce globally. The response from the Biden Administration has been to return to multilateralism. They have explored the possibility of restarting the Iran nuclear deal, reclaiming leadership on climate change and Pacific trade, and have visibly strengthened alliances damaged by the previous administration’s transactional approach. There are signs however, that much of Biden’s multilateral tendencies are superficial, leaving us to wonder whether we are witnessing a rocky return to the status quo ante or if Trump left us with a new, less-cooperative, normal.

Biden kicks off first NATO summit with focus on China, Russia https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-kicks-first-nato-summit-plans-focus-russia-china-n1270645
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg speaks with President Joe Biden during a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of a NATO summit in Brussels, Monday, June 14, 2021.

Trade

Poised to become the world’s leading industrial power by 2049, China’s National People’s Congress released long-term objectives shortly following their centenary celebration in July. Central to these objectives is China’s “dual circulation strategy,” that will allow a balance of domestic demand and export markets to spur economic recovery since the outbreak of COVID. In the short term, dual circulation will integrate with the current Belt and Road Initiative. A good example of this integration is the Colombo Port City (CPC) in Sri Lanka. Through real estate development, business development, and technical outbound investment, China plans to launch CPC as a financial services center for South Asia. The strategy behind the project presents a challenge to the influence of the United States in Asia, a challenge that has been growing for decades. 

After four years of self-defeating hostility from the Trump Administration toward trade agreements, the White House is making superficial attempts to regain a place in the Indo-Pacific economic order. While on the surface this seems a repudiation of the previous administration’s trade policy, it is more a reflection of reality in the region. Despite the differences in tone, Biden has done little to advance climate goals or bolster the successor to the Trans-Pacific Partnership; the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TPP (CPTPP). In addition, the domestic indecision that mired US vaccine assistance earlier this year made it seem as or more cynical than the overt vaccine “diplomacy” practiced by China and Russia. On trade, climate, and the pandemic, the United States is struggling to lead and failing to find a way to make multilateralism work. On security, the situation is more complicated. 

Security

In September, US foreign policy concerns about China took on a distinctly military focus when the leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced the AUKUS security deal. In their piece: Collateral Impact: The Calculus of AUKUS, Travis Johnson and Lino Miani analyzed the potentially far-reaching impact of the trilateral agreement. The centerpiece of the deal was the provision of nuclear submarines to Australia which came at the expense of a similar arrangement with France. The French submarine deal had long been the subject of controversy in Canberra because it was estimated to be $70 billion over budget and had failed to deliver any significant capability in the five years since its inception. The subsequent outrage from Paris prompted discord between allies and put pressure on certain provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). An erosion of these accords leaves room for Chinese diplomacy to further divide the United States from its European allies in ways that are not directly connected to AUKUS. 

Any success or failure of AUKUS in the Indo-Pacific will be completely overshadowed by the drama of the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The last year of the Trump presidency featured an apparent drive for a deal with the Taliban at any cost. With little room to maneuver that didn’t just prolong the war, President Biden extended the Trump Administration’s May 1st deadline for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops but did nothing to advance a deal between Kabul and the Taliban. Ultimately the delay simply allowed America’s enemy of two decades to position itself for a takeover as American troops managed a desperate and devastatingly chaotic last stand at the airport. With the Taliban back in charge, America cut ties with Afghanistan and now sits on the sidelines while the Central Asian winter and an unfamiliarity with actual governance has rendered the Taliban unable to provide for millions while they consolidate their power.  

More worrying perhaps has been the unexpected and seemingly unprovoked escalation of tension in eastern Ukraine. A large Russian military buildup so alarmed Washington that President Biden spent the better part of a week in early December in virtual summits with NATO and other allied leaders and ultimately Russian President Vladimir Putin. The solidarity from NATO was effective at deescalating tension, at least temporarily, but must be viewed in light of intra-allied stresses caused by AUKUS and the US decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. Though it is not completely clear that Russia is deterred, Putin’s bold saber-rattling has succeeded in igniting a debate over the legitimacy of NATO expansion in the 1990s. The Kremlin’s seemingly outrageous demands would not have been outrageous in 1997. In 2021 Putin is pressing an advantage that only he can see. Whatever the eventual outcome of the crisis, Ukrainian membership in NATO is dead in the water. 

Alliances and the return of multilateralism represents the hallmark of 2021. Yet, strategy must not be cooperation for cooperation’s sake. NATO was founded in 1949 with the original purpose of ensuring that the core industrial, economic, and military regions of the world did not fall under the sway of a hostile power. The case of AUKUS is cut from the same cloth. Still, expansion should not be a substitute for long-term stability or diplomacy. Where Western sanctions against Russia have shown success, a similar military presence in Ukraine risks the threat of all out war. Ultimately, diplomacy, trade, and security must serve those willing to build and balance the peaceful international order. 

Travis Johnson is an active duty US Marine pursuing a MA degree in intelligence studies and is the associate editor for The Affiliate Network.

Europe

A Tale of Two Armies: Defending NATO

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During the NATO Summit in Brussels earlier this year, the President of the United States, leader of one of the founding member states of the Alliance, stunned the world when he reportedly declared – in a meeting of the heads of state and government – that the USA would “go it alone” if the Allies failed to increase defense spending. With Alliance unity considered a lynchpin of security in Europe, the mere perception of cracks in its armor could make 70 years of peace vulnerable to collapse. In response, some European Union (EU) members are reviving an old idea and seeking to reverse Europe’s reliance for its security on the United States by creating another military apparatus: the European Army. To some, the concept is a fool’s errand. It runs counter to NATO and is at odds with the EU’s purpose. More importantly, it is harmful to the relationship between Europe and the United States.

Fundamentals

“World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it.”

– Robert Schuman

In 1946, as Europe struggled to rebuild after the Second World War, a young State Department official named George Kennan wrote there could be “no permanent peaceful coexistence” with the Soviet Union. With those few words, Kennan summarized the political reality that would dominate American strategic thinking for the next 50 years. Thereafter, the looming Soviet threat forced western European nations toward greater military and economic integration and inspired support from the United States which otherwise would have retreated into its traditional isolationism. Announcing his plan for the recovery of Europe, George Marshall, then US Secretary of State, claimed the “remedy [to prevent further deterioration] lies in…restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole.” As Nicolaus Mills explains, “the genius of the Marshall Plan was that it enabled the countries of Western Europe to look upon one another not as rivals competing in a zero-sum game but as partners with a chance to gain from each other through liberalized trade and interchangeable currencies made reliable by American backing.” European security, at least in the American view, began with sound economic fundamentals.

Unfortunately, the USSR remained undeterred and continued to spread Communist influence throughout Eastern Europe. On April 4th, 1949, as a result of this seemingly uncontested expansion, twelve European nations and the United States ratified the Washington Treaty establishing NATO as a mechanism to deter and repel Soviet aggression. Accordingly, European countries began integrating their economies through a series of treaties that provided a formal construct for their collective economic interests. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC), among others, fostered a cooperative international environment whereby each nation could better control its destiny. Perhaps by design, they also formed the foundations of what would become the European Union.

Senior British and French officers during NATO exercise in West Germany (1950)
Senior British and French officers during NATO exercise in West Germany (1950) Source Credit: Imperial War Museum

Concerned about the overwhelming combat power of the Red Army in 1950, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) contended “the appropriate and early rearming of Western Germany is of fundamental importance to the defense of Western Europe against the USSR.” France vehemently opposed this idea and offered an alternative. Designed to stop German rearmament, the French Plan, designed by Defense Minister René Pleven, called for a highly integrated European Army. The UK worried Pleven’s “European Defense Community” (EDC) might weaken NATO, but did not refuse the treaty outright. The American government, an early advocate for rearming Germany, questioned the logic of Pleven’s proposal. The US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, claimed the EDC was “hastily conceived without serious military advice… unrealistic and undesirable.” In the eyes of western officials, the Pleven Plan, and ultimately the EDC, would result in “duplication, confusion and divided responsibility.” Though several European nations agreed to the terms contained within the Treaty Establishing the European Defense Community on May 27, 1952, the French Parliament refused to ratify it. The EDC collapsed and the allies quickly integrated the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO, allowing West Germany to rearm under a “collective self-defense” organization. France’s concern for German rearmament subsided, and with it, the push for an army outside NATO became a great taboo of the Cold War.

The European Army Reemerges

2018 NATO Summit
2018 NATO Summit Source Credit: Express.co.uk

Contemporary politics and a shaky transatlantic relationship are the rationales behind the European Army’s recent resurgence. US President Trump’s demand for NATO allies to pay their “fair share and meet their financial obligations” enflames Europe’s desire to extricate itself from the US-dominated security relationship. Jean-Claude Juncker, the European Commission President, expressed this sentiment in a 2015 interview saying, “A joint EU army would show the world that there would never again be a war between EU countries… such an army would also help us to form common foreign and security policies and allow Europe to take on responsibility in the world… a common European army would convey a clear message to Russia that we are serious about defending our European values.”

It is therefore unsurprising the EU began developing a joint military investment strategy exclusive of NATO and the United States in November 2017. Under the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) agreement, EU members agreed to leverage their combined economies of scale while not explicitly adhering to NATO’s defense spending goal of two-percent gross domestic product (GDP). Responding to US concerns that an increase in EU defense spending could distract from NATO activities, the European Council President, Donald Tusk, warned the United States to “appreciate [its] allies, after all [it doesn’t] have that many.” The rhetorical back-and-forth between western nations continues to drive the United States and its European allies farther apart and provides fodder for some to demand a robust, Europe-only, military apparatus. In late August, French President Emmanuel Macron verbalized this idea, telling European ambassadors “Europe [could] no longer entrust its security to the United States alone. It’s up to us to guarantee our security.”

A Tale Not Worth Retelling

Overt discussion of an extra-NATO military organization is no longer the great taboo it was during the Cold War, but the European Army generates more questions than it answers. The stated aim of the European Union was to end “the frequent and bloody wars between neighbors” by creating a common economic and financial market for European nations. It was never intended to compete with NATO as a provider of multi-lateral military power. The logic the UK used to protest the EDC in the 1950s is still applicable today; that a vote for the European Army dilutes NATO’s resources, degrades its unity of effort, and convolutes the EU’s purpose. With over 70 years of experience working through common funding, command-and-control, training, standardization, doctrine, and capability development, NATO remains the gold standard of collective defense. By contrast, Europe has not developed protocols for controlling the European Army, resolving conflicts between member states, or even disputes between those member states and the EU itself.

European leaders should recognize the dangers of moving forward with their own military unless their long-term goal is to mitigate US influence over European military spending. Perhaps goaded by spite for the current US Administration, Europe is on the brink of a major strategic error. In this tale of two armies, an untested and unfunded European Army is not only a poor substitute for NATO, but it is also a threat to the viability of the Alliance and the security of Europe.

Major Steve “SWAP” Nolan is a US Air Force Weapons Officer, C17 Instructor Pilot, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) graduate, and is currently serving as the Director of Operations for the 21st Airlift Squadron, California. He holds a Bachelor’s degree in Human Resource Management and three Master’s degrees in Business Administration and Operations Management with a focus on Air Mobility Logistics, and Military Strategy. Steve recently published an article discussing how the US Air Force can improve its talent management practices and is currently working on another article based on his SAASS thesis: Triggers, Traps, and Mackinder’s Maps – The Russian Bear, NATO, and the Near Abroad.

Asia, Foreign Policy

Asian Aspirations: NATO Looks East

As NATO’s mission in Afghanistan completes its transition from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the non-combatant Resolute Support Mission (RSM), the question on the minds of senior Allied leaders is how to maintain Alliance cohesion without the massive political-military gravity of the war to keep the Nations engaged with one another. Cohesion may seem like an odd thing to worry about after 70 years of Allied success but what is not apparent to many is that for the last 14 years, the war in Afghanistan has given NATO tremendous energy and unity of purpose. Now, even with events in the Ukraine giving the Alliance renewed vigor, NATO finds itself adrift, searching for a purpose that all 28 member states can agree on even as Europe is beset on all sides by complex and serious challenges to its security.

The Ukraine crisis aside, NATO’s answer to this dangerous environment is to look outside its borders. With compound threats from transnational terrorism, illicit drugs, human trafficking, and seemingly endless instability on Europe’s southern flank, it is very easy to see why this strategy makes sense. While the Alliance has a growing number of legal vehicles at its disposal for reaching out, it was adoption of the Berlin Partnership Policy in 2011 –specifically the creation of the Individual Partnership Cooperation Plan (IPCP)– that truly opened doors to military cooperation beyond Europe and North America. Since that time, Japan, South Korea, Iraq, New Zealand, Sweden, Mongolia, and Australia have finalized IPCPs with NATO.

Measuring Asian Engagement

While all the military diplomacy sounds very promising, in real terms it has not yet amounted to much. The Nations all agree that military cooperation with non-NATO partners is important but other than to support RSM or Operation Ocean Shield, an ongoing operation in the Gulf of Aden, NATO forces have not ventured beyond Europe since the 2011 Foreign Ministers meeting that led to the Berlin Policy. While it would be a good first step to have Asian forces participating in NATO exercises, military cooperation will need to occur on partner nation territory to meet the goals of the Allied strategy. This is no small matter. Funding, organizing, supplying, and controlling multinational exercises is a complex and expensive endeavor; even with 70 years of procedure to guide the planning. IPCPs lack the administrative backbone necessary to run a large-scale NATO exercise outside its borders and a notable exercise failure could make such cooperation very unpopular very quickly. In this sensitive space at the intersection of politics, military action, diplomacy, and fiscal restraint, the utility of one tool rises above all the others: Special Operations Forces or SOF.

Reliable, rapidly deployable, relatively inexpensive, and capable of secrecy and discretion, SOF has long been a favorite tool of nations for building new relationships of this type. In Asia in particular, Special Operations Forces have broader utility than naval or air units for the simple reason that while not all potential Asian partners have viable navies or air forces, most have credible SOF. Paradoxically, when it comes to Special Operations, limitations on engagement lay with NATO partners which rarely share their SOF capabilities with the Alliance. Even those member states that maintain robust relationships with Asian SOF units (the United States and the United Kingdom, and to a lesser degree, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Portugal), rarely commit their special forces to NATO missions. But as Asia grows in economic, social, and political importance, there are many reasons why Allied nations may be more likely to share their SOF in the future.

Asian SOF Sniper
Credible SOF partners: Cold weather training of ROK Army Special Forces snipers in 2014

Asia is a Big Deal

The rough numbers behind Asia’s rise are no mystery to readers of The Affiliate Network: 60% of the planet’s population is Asian, their defense budgets comprise 25% of the world’s total, and their economies represent 30% of global gross domestic product; but relationships between NATO SOF units and their Asian counterparts are underdeveloped. It is therefore important to remember some things about SOF in Asia: with the exception of Thailand, Asian security services from India to Indonesia to North Korea trace their roots directly to the Japanese Imperial Army or to Allied efforts to counter it. During the Second World War, Japanese graduates of the intelligence school at Nakano mobilized the political and military leadership of occupied areas to maximize contributions to the greater Japanese economy.[1] This fact ties modern Asian security services to politics in ways that have been remarkably consistent over the last 70 years. Secondly, though Asian governments generally maintain active relationships with their former colonial sponsors, these relationships are not proprietary, nor have they been constant. The result is that with few exceptions, European SOF have very little experience in what is rapidly becoming the world’s most important geopolitical arena. Today, as NATO and its member states wake up to the opportunities and risks inherent in South and East Asia, this lack of experience collides squarely with a desire to build relationships there and to operationalize the Berlin Partnership Policy in a way that can provide a springboard to larger and more regular interactions.

Addressing this capability gap begins at home. European SOF seeking to operate in Asia will find themselves in a bewildering cultural and linguistic landscape where modern politics intersects 5000 years of history and religion in confounding ways. While vital cultural awareness is next to impossible to build in a classroom, language capabilities can and should be developed this way despite the time and money required to maximize these skills. Secondly, many Asian (especially Southeast Asian) top-tier SOF capabilities reside in national police forces whereas European SOF units are overwhelmingly military. This presents an obstacle for many European nations that maintain strict legal prohibitions on military relations with police forces. NATO nations interested in undertaking Alliance SOF missions in the region must take steps to eliminate these regulatory barriers before they cause a problem. Thirdly, European SOF forces lack strategic mobility. While military transport aircraft are available, even large powers France and Germany struggle with lift capacity. European SOF will need to develop a familiarity with the nuances of projecting power via global shipping, something that is often particularly tricky in situations involving weapons, narcotic medicines, and sensitive technologies. Lastly, European SOF will need to sort through a host of details required for success in Asia; from having contracting support and flexible funding for logistics, to having 220-volt power tools on hand, to coming to terms with murky associations between some Asian SOF units and national political parties, human rights issues, and wide variations in quality of their counterparts.

Engaging militarily in Asia will in some ways be a difficult undertaking for NATO, especially in light of growing threats close to the continent, but armed with the right knowledge and preparation, SOF will be a key tool in expanding partnerships in fulfillment of NATO’s Strategic Concept.  Whether this provides the cohesion Allied leaders seek remains to be seen.

[1] The founders of many post-war SE Asian governments and militaries were trained by the Japanese and later switched sides. Examples are Ne Win and Aung San (Burma), Subas Chandra Bose (India), Sukarno and Zulkifli Lubis (Indonesia), Bảo Đại (Vietnam), and others.

Lino Miani is a retired US Army Special Forces officer, author of The Sulu Arms Market, and CEO of Navisio Global LLC.