Tag Archives: Middle East

Middle East, Politics, Security

Lebanon’s Prime Minister-Delegate Faces Long Odds

This article has been republished with permission from our partner, Stratfor. The original version was first published in Stratfor’s WORLDVIEW and can be found here.
HIGHLIGHTS
  • Hassan Diab, who is set to become Lebanon’s new prime minister, will not overcome the country’s political, economic or security challenges.
  • Prolonged political paralysis will heighten Lebanon’s economic crisis, and potentially spark violence as major factions like Hezbollah struggle to hold onto power.
  • Heightened tensions between the United States and Iran could also lead to more sanctions on Lebanon, or even to open conflict there.

Lebanon’s new candidate for prime minister, Hassan Diab, stands little chance of breaking Lebanon’s political deadlock. And he will face even greater challenges than political paralysis, such as a worsening economic crisis and security crises as Hezbollah turns to stronger tactics to maintain its influence and as the chances grow of a U.S.-Iran regional conflict that could draw in Lebanon.

The Big Picture
Lebanon is engulfed in political paralysis and economic crisis, and its prime minister candidate, Hassan Diab, will not have many ways to overcome either. As the economy worsens, Lebanon’s security situation will become even more precarious. Meanwhile, rising tensions between Iran and the United States could spark a conflict that brings a regional war to Lebanon itself.
 
See Broken Contracts in the Middle East

Daunting Prospects for Domestic or Foreign Support

Diab, who is set to succeed longtime Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri as prime minister, will face substantial hurdles. These include winning the support of a protest movement that will not accept a prime minister with ties to the establishment, which they blame for Lebanon’s economic crisis and long-standing corruption. They also include simultaneously winning the support of either the country’s March 8 alliance, to which Hezbollah belongs, or the March 14 alliance, to which al-Hariri’s Future Movement belongs. To maintain the support of either of the alliances, Lebanese prime ministers must dole out state support to them and their adherents. But it is precisely that sort of insider activity that is motivating protesters to take to the streets. Protests have helped accelerate Lebanon’s economic crisis by disrupting the economy, driving away tourists and causing capital flight. By pleasing either protesters or politicians, a prime minister angers the other, making it much harder to govern. At the same time that securing domestic support will prove daunting, foreign support will be harder to find. Lebanese prime ministers have often been able to govern thanks to foreign largesse. That support, which in the past has taken the form of direct U.S. or French aid and favorable bond purchases from Gulf Arab states, has allowed the government to spend lavishly to keep its own supporters happy, often through providing government jobs or favorable contracts. But foreign benefactors have become unwilling to grant Lebanon new aid unless it enacts austerity measures, a requirement that would cut the funds the government needs to maintain patronage networks.
This will undermine the political consensus among Lebanon’s major parties (and their associated militias) that has kept them from challenging the sectarian political system, which since independence has guaranteed that a Christian will serve as president, a Sunni as prime minister and a Shiite as speaker of parliament. Moreover, the nonsectarian nature of the Lebanese protest movement undermines Lebanon’s sectarian political system, challenging traditional political players.

Few Good Options for Politicians

Lebanon’s government and political insiders have little recourse. They cannot rally protest movements against their political enemies, like the March 8 and March 14 alliances did in 2005 after Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s slaying created a political crisis. Today, with the bulk of the protesters angry at all political parties, the alliances don’t have the same rallying power. Beirut can’t increase spending to alleviate the country’s economic woes either, given the drop in foreign aid, the government’s indebtedness and its dwindling foreign reserves. Diab is not immune to these challenges. Though a relatively apolitical Sunni, he faces strong resistance from the protest movement in large part because he’s seen as too close to Hezbollah — and therefore as too much of a political insider. He also lacks the kind of foreign allies to tap for aid that al-Hariri had, though even if Diab did ask, aid would probably not be forthcoming anyway. He is therefore likely to struggle to accomplish much once in office, and may not stay there long. But even obtaining and exercising power effectively would still not solve three other major problems bedeviling the country: the economy, Hezbollah and potential U.S.-Iranian conflict.

The Economy, Hezbollah and U.S.-Iranian Conflict

Lebanon’s deeply unstable economy is worsening. Some major Lebanese bonds are due as early as March, and foreign exchange reserves, a bulwark the country had built up in case of a crisis, are strained by a combination of U.S. banking sanctions aimed at Hezbollah and the deteriorating economy. The United States has broken with its previous policy by bringing sanctions against Lebanese banks and upsetting the country’s delicate internal balance. In 2020, it is likely to seek to further sanction Hezbollah — and by extension Lebanon’s economy, since Hezbollah is entangled with much of Lebanon’s business. These sanctions would worsen Lebanon’s economic situation and complicate any potential foreign bailouts. The longer the economic crisis goes on, the more likely Lebanon is to run short of basic goods and be unable to pay state worker salaries, issues that will impact all sects and political parties. That will weaken the insiders’ hold on their old loyalists and strengthen the protest movement. In a bid to salvage whatever legitimacy they can, Lebanon’s factions — especially Hezbollah — will pivot from financial incentives to physical intimidation, potentially sparking a civil crisis. Hezbollah and its allies would prefer to avoid civil conflict, but they do not want to lose their gains from the May 2018 election, when a Hezbollah ally became the country’s health minister, giving him significant patronage powers. They also do not want to see the emergence of a less sectarian Lebanon, since this could cause voters in Hezbollah turf to consider backing another party. To prevent this outcome, Hezbollah has already sought to cow Shiites into not participating in protests.
Hezbollah will not purposefully stoke a civil conflict lest things get out of hand, but its increased use of physical intimidation may spawn one anyway. 
But while Hezbollah will not purposefully stoke a civil conflict lest things get out of hand, its increased use of physical intimidation may spawn one anyway, by setting up potential clashes between Hezbollah and protesters, the Lebanese army or other armed political factions. Any ensuing confrontations could eventually spark civil conflict. If that happens, foreigners are likely to get involved. The Americans, the Israelis, the Iranians, the Gulf Arabs and even the Syrians, Russians, and Turks all have an interest in shaping the country’s security situation. Meanwhile, no Lebanese faction has the power to stop the U.S.-Iran conflict, the ramifications of which could hit Lebanon, whether via sanctions or outright military conflict. Should this come to pass, Lebanese political paralysis would get even worse, while the country would face an economic and security crisis unlike anything since its 2006 war with Israel. Moreover, Hezbollah, Tehran’s most capable proxy, could find itself as the spearhead of Iranian retaliation against Israeli or American targets. Doing so, however, would invite a massive Israeli and/or U.S. response in Lebanon. And a military conflict of that scale would usher in yet another troubling chapter in Lebanon’s crisis-ridden history.
 
Editor’s Note: The map accompanying this assessment has been replaced to correct a mislabeled city name.

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Foreign Policy, Middle East, Politics

Strategic Heights

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On the 21st of March 2019, with a characteristic lack of warning, the President of the United States stunned allies and adversaries alike by announcing — on Twitter — the United States should “fully recognize Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights.” The surprise move reversed 52 years of US policy toward the contested area and prompted emergency meetings in capitals across the globe. Within minutes, a storm of diplomatic protests from around the world reiterated support for a 1981 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 497) that specifically rejects an Israeli move to annex the Golan.

Not surprisingly, Syria vowed to retake its strategic terrain by “all means available”, a proclamation vigorously supported by Syria’s traditional backers, Russia and Iran. They were not alone, however. Even America’s allies rejected the move, citing principles of customary international law and warning the President it could decrease stability in the Middle East and have ripple effects elsewhere. As the President tweeted, the Golan Heights is strategically important and its annexation will have strategic consequences.

Trump Golan Tweet
President Trump forecasted his move to recognize Israeli rule in the strategic Golan Heights.

Strategic History

The topography and hydrology of the Golan has divided empires, fixed boundaries, and concentrated warfare since Biblical times. When one considers its history, it is easy to understand the Golan’s intense strategic importance to the security and stability of the greater Middle East. Shaped like a bowl surrounding the Sea of Galilee, the Golan Heights provides a significant percentage of Israel’s fresh water. The terrain feature rises rapidly east from the Sea of Galilee to a ridge that towers 1000 feet over the Transjordanian Plateau and provides a commanding view across southern Syria to the ancient Damascus-Amman Road. Whoever holds the Golan Heights commands all north-south movement in a significant part of the Middle East.

The first Jewish communities settled in the Golan in the 6th Century BCE but later fell under Seleucid rule after the partition of Alexander the Great’s empire in the 3rd Century BCE. The Jews regained their independence after a revolt only to be conquered and crushed by the Roman 10th Legion under Vespasian in the winter of 66 A.D.. After the fall of the Roman Empire, the area changed hands in step with the ebb and flow of fortunes in Constantinople. First the Byzantines, then the Ottomans ruled the Golan until their defeat in the First World War placed the area under the British Mandate. The British ceded it to France a year later and Syria inherited it at the end of the Mandate in 1944.

The British decision to cede the Golan Heights to France left Palestine without a defensible northeastern frontier. When Israel declared independence a few years later, it found itself in a vulnerable position with a modern Arab army in a strong position to threaten Israel’s main source of water. The Six-Day War in 1967 provided the opportunity for Tel Aviv to address the vulnerability by seizing the Golan. At the time, the United States joined the world in calling for an Israeli withdrawal, a policy every President since has supported. When Israel attempted to annex the area in 1981, the Reagan administration went even farther, joining the UN in declaring the move “null and void and without international legal effect.”

Golan Proclamation
U.S. President Donald Trump and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hold up a proclamation recognizing Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights, March 25, 2019. Source credit: REUTERS/Leah Millis/File Photo

Elsewhere Matters

President Trump’s move to recognize Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights is a historically significant break from the policies of every US President since Lyndon Johnson. Though there will be immediate impacts on the stability of the Middle East, international law and the overlapping interests of regional stakeholders will cause ripple effects on US interests in unexpected places.

When Russia employed ‘hybrid warfare’ to invade and annex Crimea in early 2014, the US response was fairly robust and focused. Aside from a frenzy of bilateral military exercises in the Baltic states and Poland, US messaging on the legality of Russia’s move battered Moscow with principles of international law. The United States specifically cited Article 2 of the UN Charter which prohibits the use of force in territorial disputes. More importantly, perhaps, the White House invoked the principle that states have an obligation ‘not to recognize as legal’ the acquisition or occupation of territory resulting from aggression or the threat or use of force. The Obama Administration argued at the time that Crimea was taken by force and therefore the United States had an obligation to reject its annexation by Russia.

Recognition of Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights effectively abandons this legal principle as a basis for US foreign policy, putting the US position at risk in Crimea and damaging other, longer-term US interests. The occupation of Northern Cyprus for example, seized by Turkey in 1974, is still not recognized internationally. President Trump’s capitulation on the Golan may give Turkey a sense that now is a good time to push for annexation of Northern Cyprus. Timing aside, such a move could threaten peace with Greece and destabilize NATO. Further afield, the principle of non-recognition protected the Baltic states for 51 years and guaranteed support for their independence after the fall of the Soviet Union. Already nervous about Russian territorial ambitions, Baltic leaders are concerned abandonment of the principle now could encourage Russian ambitions in ways detrimental to numerous NATO member states. One can imagine similar issues arising in the South China Sea and the Senkakus, and perhaps even provoking sovereignty questions in US territories conquered during World War II or the Spanish-American War.

Some argue changing the status of the Golan Heights will not significantly affect the situation on the ground. However, the political narrative will have global consequences as states with territorial disputes rush to take advantage of America’s recent flexibility with international law. As the most powerful nation in the world, the United States is the principal benefactor of an international system that affords states a privileged position on questions of sovereignty. Eroding the legal principles that underpin those positions weakens our foreign policy. Doing so in pursuit of short-term gains is the exact opposite of principled action and certainly not the height of strategic thinking.

Lino Miani, CEO Navisio Global LLC

Lino Miani is a retired US Army Special Forces officer, author of The Sulu Arms Market, and CEO of Navisio Global LLC. 

Foreign Policy

Year of the Nationalist

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In a great outpouring of respect, the world came to Washington in December to say goodbye to one of the last century’s great champions of liberal internationalism, President George H. W. Bush. The touching remembrance of a life spent connecting nations reminded us all about the value of international cooperation. However, we have to be honest with ourselves that democracy around the world is increasingly under stress.  President Bush’s funeral took on the flavor of a valiant appeal to world leaders to once again reject the forces of nationalism and authoritarianism that ignited the world twice during the last century. Despite this, the struggles that tested President Bush so many times during his career have reemerged. Therefore, we are dubbing 2018 the “Year of the Nationalist,” a moniker we hoped never to attribute to any year since the Great War buried nationalism in the misery of Flanders Fields.

A Shaky Future

Europe is at the epicenter of massive challenges to the liberalized democracies that have kept the peace since the conclusion of World War II. Lingering effects of the 2008 global recession combined with refugee crises from Syria and Libya have invigorated the demons of the globalized economy. These stressors left many feeling abandoned, and their frustration fueled a rise in nationalism. Anti-immigrant parties won large sections of governments throughout Europe. The anti-immigrant party of Sweden is now the country’s third largest political party. Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, showed such undemocratic tendencies, it prompted the typically diplomatic European Union to condemn his authoritarian leadership style. The Freedom Party in Austria, part of the governing coalition, has past ties to the Nazi Party; and Poland, currently governed by the nationalistic Law and Justice Party, is no stranger to recurring far-right demonstrations.

Meanwhile, France is experiencing nation-wide demonstrations against liberal reform initiatives, and the United Kingdom (UK) is struggling to come to terms with the aftermath of the 2016 Brexit vote. In Death of Brexit: Return from the Right, Adam Pharaoh asserted the Remain faction had initially underestimated the strong forward momentum of the British economy following the Brexit referendum but was belatedly proven right. He concluded correctly (in January) that Brexit-related economic pressure could lead ordinary Britons to call for another referendum. Indeed they did, but as the political turmoil accelerates with the approaching endgame, a second referendum is politically unlikely, leaving a worst-case “No Deal Brexit” as the only probable result.

At the exact moment the UK is withdrawing from the European Union (EU), nationalist impulses in the Trump Administration are casting doubt on America’s commitment to NATO. Cracks in Alliance unity have real consequences and may be the reason for recent tests of resolve by Russia, which seems on the verge of a massive escalation in Ukraine following a crisis at sea resulted in the capture of three Ukrainian ships by Russia. Meanwhile, China’s Belt and Road Initiative is expanding Beijing’s influence into an uncertain EU by pushing increased reliance on Chinese investments in Eastern Europe. This convergence is causing real fear throughout the European community and reviving an old idea about the utility of a European army. In A Tale of Two Armies: Defending NATO, Steve Nolan argued that a European Army is at odds with the EU’s purpose and would, regrettably, dilute critical support for NATO itself. Worse, it would further strain relations with the US and ultimately be a liability to the security of Europe rather than its guarantor.

Authoritarianism Reigns

Europe is not the only region experiencing resurgent nationalism. Latin America has its own brand of authoritarianism fueled by rampant organized crime and corruption. In Tearing Down the Walls, Ligia Lee described the crisis associated with transnational gangs in Central America and analyzed a corrective measure that depends on international outreach rather than seclusion behind walls.

Looking further south, John Boswell discussed tensions in Peru over last year’s pardon of its former president, Alberto Fujimori, in Pardon Me: Peru’s Fujimori Problem. The controversial leader was serving a 25-year prison sentence for corruption and human rights abuses when his pardon resulted in nationwide protests and a condemnation from the UN Human Rights Council. That drama and the political turmoil surrounding it has since brought down President Kuczynski and landed Fujimori’s daughter Keiko – herself a powerful presidential candidate – in jail on a “preventative sentence”.

Though Peru seems at the front end of an excruciating period of political soul-searching, nothing compares to the immense man-made disaster playing out in Venezuela. The failure of authoritarian nationalism in the Bolivarian Republic is the genesis of an exploding humanitarian catastrophe. In Maduro Drones On, Lino Miani argued that President Maduro’s repressive tactics to maintain power have degraded security in what was once South America’s richest state. The attempted assassination of Maduro by aerial drones marked the first notable proliferation of the technology outside of the Middle East and should serve as a wake-up call for security practitioners everywhere.

MBS
Authoritarianism personified: Mohammed bin Salman is the face of one of the world’s last functional monarchies.

The Status Quo Remains

While democracy continues to struggle in Europe and Latin America, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry is inspiring the worst impulses of authoritarian nationalists from Ankara to Aden. In Master of Puppets: Pulling the Strings in Turkey, Nuno Felix called into question the stability of President Erdogan’s power as his pursuit of the now exiled Fethullah Gülen continues for its fifth year. This history describes the context behind Erdogan’s authoritarian tactics to amass power and sheds light on his more recent attempts to exploit the murder of Jamal Khashoggi to drive a wedge between regional rival Saudi Arabia and the United States.

In The Huydaydah Trap, Lino Miani outlined the precarious position of the United States in balancing regional conflicts. With strategic resolution of the war in Yemen focused on a single port city on its Red Sea coast, the sum total of centuries of geopolitical rivalry is concentrated on the previously unknown port of Hudaydah. Though most experts agree that battle there will trigger unimaginable suffering by famine and disease, America’s humane and decent call for a ceasefire could revitalize a beleaguered Houthi resistance and prolong the misery of millions.

Best Wishes

Our analysis throughout 2018 highlights the issues that result from a global shift away from international cooperation. We hope President Bush’s funeral will serve as a bulwark against authoritarian nationalism and not as a memorial to international cooperation itself. Though we will never be able to predict the future, one thing we can all agree on is that a well-informed public is a good thing. Our hope is to provide you with the best context to issues facing our world. Follow us throughout 2019 to receive more insightful articles as we make sense of a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape. For now, we at the Affiliate Network would like to wish you a very happy holiday season and a great beginning to the new year.

CrushThe views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of any government or private institution.

Major John “Crush” Gerlach is the Blogmaster and editor for the Affiliate Network. He is a US Air Force Officer and C-17A Weapons Instructor Pilot with deployments in support of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. He is currently serving in Lyon, France.