Asia, China, Foreign Policy

The Malay Annals: History Describes the Present

The Malay Annals, or “Sejarah Melayu” in Malay, are a romanticized history on the rise and fall of the Malaccan Sultanate interspersed with mythical and fantastical elements. To put the text in historical context, it was composed approximately a century after the fall of the Malaccan sultanate, marking the end of the sultanate’s undisputed rule over both sides of the Strait of Malacca. The oldest version is dated approximately two centuries after the end of the Ming Dynasty’s short-lived maritime Pax Sinica that extended from East Asia to the tip of the Indian sub-continent.

Within its text are key passages describing the Malay worldview of their relationship with the Sinic empires, specifically the Ming dynasty. The interactions cited within afford a remarkably contemporary frame of Malaysia’s current foreign policy towards China, its status as regional power and an emerging superpower, as well as Beijing’s claims towards almost the entirety of South China Sea. Selected texts from the Malay Annals reproduced in this article are drawn from Dr. John Leyden’s translation published in 1821 and are presented in the order as they appear in the Leyden manuscript.

“Sit atop the mountain and watch the tigers fight” – Chinese saying

Then, it was reported in the land of China, that Raja Suran was advancing against them with an innumerable army, and had arrived at the country of Tamsak. The raja of China was alarmed at hearing this intelligence, and said to his mantris and chieftains, “If Kling Raja approach, the country will be inevitably ruined; what method do you advise to prevent his approach?” Then, a sagacious mantri of China said, “Lord of the world, your slave will fall on a device.”

King Suran is described in the text as a true descendant of Alexander the Great. At this point, there is no mention yet of the Malays or Malay lands, only that King Suran set forth from India intending to conquer China. The king of China, upon learning of King Suran’s approach, appreciated this new danger and consulted with his court. One of his ministers contrived a plan to deceive King Suran regarding the distance of China from India with the use of rusty needles and aging sailors. The ruse succeeded in deterring King Suran from invading China.

What is striking is that the Malaccan sultanate perceived the need for another great power to balance and counter the hegemony of the Ming dynasty. When the Trump administration recently announced that the U.S. explicitly considers the PRC’s territorial claims in South China Sea as illegal, it merely elicited a decidedly neutral statement couched in non-committal language from Malaysia. Malaysia’s foreign minister, Hishammuddin Hussein, stated, “Malaysia looks forward to continuing the discussions to conclude an effective and substantive Code of Conduct in the South China Sea that would encompass elements which reflect the rights and interests of all parties.”

It should be noted that Malaysia conducts, with little to no domestic fanfare, far more bilateral military exercises of substance with the U.S. than with PRC. A recent standoff between China’s state-owned and military vessels with a Malaysian-chartered Panamanian-flagged drillship and several U.S. Navy ships did not even make the local news cycle in Malaysia. In other words, while Malaysia may loudly proclaim strict neutrality or assign tensions solely to ambitions of superpowers, at best, Putrajaya, the seat of Malaysia’s federal-level government ministries, quietly aspires for U.S. alone to do the heavy lifting. At worst, it hopes that an American presence gives considerable pause to China’s assertive ambitions, sans a hint of Malaysian participation.

“That’s the way the cookie crumbles” – American saying

Then the raja of China sent to Palembang, to Raja Sangsapurba ten prows, to ask his daughter in marriage. They brought with them as presents three bahars of gold, and a great quantity of articles of China. Along with them one hundred male Chinese slaves, and a young Chinese of noble birth; a hundred female Chineses; all to convey the raja’s letter to Sangsapurba. They reached Palembang, and delivered the letter of the raja of China, in the most respectful manner, in the hall of audience.

King Sangsapurba is represented by the Malay Annals as the first Malay king who also laid claim as a direct descendant of Alexander the Great. His appearance in the Annals suggests that the Malays drew heavily from Hindu cosmology (Shiva possibly) in that he was hinted as a sort of demi-god, being deigned to descend from the heavens in order to rule over the Malays. Upon receiving the proposal for the hand of his daughter from the king of China, Sangsapurba consulted with his retinue. They concurred that Palembang, Sangsapurba’s capital, would be at great risk should the proposal be refused and, at the same time, counseled that there was no greater king than the king of China.

While there are historical accounts of Chinese vessels operating around Malay territory for centuries, it would be Zheng He’s famous treasure fleets that would leave an indelible mark and distinct impression on the Malaccan sultanate. The above passage informs readers that the sultanate was more than aware of the proximity of the Chinese mainland to Malacca. Additionally, with the appearance of several large multi-masted ships crewed by hundreds, the Malaccan sultanate understood that the fiat of the Ming Dynasty would not, and could not, be denied. Thus, the Ming dynasty records duly noted visits by Parameswara, the founder of the Malaccan sultanate, and later of his successor, to the Ming capital to receive gifts from the Ming emperor as acknowledgment of their legitimacy as rulers of the Malacca city-state.

Translated today, Malaysia would unlikely initiate or risk direct action to contest incursions by China’s Coast Guard or the People’s Liberation Army Navy into Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Unlike Vietnam, which could fall back on a long history of resisting Chinese invasion and occupation to rally its people in the face of overwhelming numbers and odds, Putrajaya seems to accept that it would likely be fruitless to contest regular incursions by China. Dr. Mahathir Mohammad, then speaking as prime minister, affirmed the long-held precept in late 2019 during an interview discussing China’s maritime claims, saying, “We watch what they are doing, we report what they are doing, but we do not chase them away or try to be aggressive.”

“The measure of clothing against yourself” – Malay saying

The sago was then brought before the raja, and the raja of China asked how it was made. Tun Parapati Puti replied that it was made by rolling it up into grains, and that the raja of Malacca had sent him a grain for every person in his dominions, till the prahu had been loaded, for so great is the number of the subjects of our raja that it is impossible to count them. The raja of China said, “of a truth the raja of Malacca is a powerful raja, his subjects are in truth very numerous, and no wise inferior to mine. It will be very proper for me to connect myself with him.”

The Malaccan sultanate would not have easily accepted the conceit of being in the thrall of the Ming dynasty. The above passage indicates that the sultanate sought a level footing as either an equal or a near-peer to the Ming dynasty. It may have likely been aimed at placating the domestic audiences within the palace, seeing that as it was successive Malaccan rulers that regularly paid court to the Ming emperor rather than the other way around. Unsurprisingly, the above passage cites the marriage of the “Ming princess” Han Li-Po to Sultan Mansur Shah of Malacca as a mark of high esteem by the king of China.

The annals also describe an unusual event which further buttresses the Sultanate’s desire for equality or near-peer status. Shortly after the above passage, the text reveals that the king of China was “seized with an itch of the whole body”. Upon consultation, it was discovered that this itch could only be cured by “drinking the water which has washed the feet and face of the raja of Malacca.” An emissary was dispatched from China to the Malaccan court to apply for said healing waters. The bodily itch subsided after it was applied as prescribed. The king of China pledged that the king of Malacca would no longer be required to pay obeisance at the Chinese court thanks to this miraculous cure. In this, the third and final leg of Malaysia’s diplomatic stance towards China is revealed.

So long as China is willing to acknowledge or publicly confer a near-peer status to Malaysia, “give face”, and support inconsequential initiatives sponsored by Putrajaya, the latter will not rock the boat. Former Malaysian foreign minister, Saifuddin Abdullah, reiterated the point in late 2019, citing that bilateral ties were that of “friendship based on civilization”. It is not a new stance and was first iterated by Malaysia’s second prime minister Tun Razak in 1974, who followed in the wake of Nixon’s ground-breaking visit in 1972, by stating Malaysia’s ancient ties with China. On a more cautionary note, this story from the Malay Annals may not bode well for Malaysia’s Sinic minority should future events transpire that are detrimental towards Malaysia’s maritime claims.

“It’s the same ol’, same ol’ situation” – Motley Crue

To place the historical context of the Malay Annals in modern perspective, at the peak of Pax Sinica under the Ming dynasty, Zheng He’s treasure fleet carried out counterpiracy operations near Palembang, Sumatra, and instituted regime change in Colombo, present-day Sri Lanka. Just as it was then and today, a superpower’s reach that meddled in regional politics and exuding a somewhat condescending attitude would have likely triggered internal resentments that needed to be addressed or tamped down in favor of expediently and profitably managing their kingdoms’ generally unequal relationship with the Ming dynasty. The encounter between the Ming dynasty and Malaccan sultanate resulted in a foreign policy primer encapsulated by these key passages in a classical Malay text that is still assiduously cultivated by modern-day Malaysian diplomats and public officials.

Teoh Jit Khiam works in private practice. He writes on topics concerning Asian politics and history.

Asia, China, Foreign Policy, Politics

What the End of One Country, Two Systems Means for Hong Kong, Taiwan and the World

This article has been republished with permission from our partner, Stratfor. The original version was first published in Stratfor’s WORLDVIEW and can be found here.

HIGHLIGHTS

  • Beijing’s decision to impose a long-delayed security law on Hong Kong reflects the mainland’s growing concern with challenges to national unity.
  • Hong Kong will face an acceleration of reintegration, and a more rapid erosion of its special status, while Taiwan will face increased economic and military pressure from the mainland.
  • China will use its political, economic and, if need be, military might to assert its sovereignty over its periphery, including Taiwan and the South China Sea.

Beijing’s decision to impose a long-delayed security law on Hong Kong reflects the mainland’s growing concern with challenges to national unity ahead of next year’s 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party. But it is more immediately driven by the rising violence in Hong Kong and the political evolution in Taiwan. Despite international criticism, China will strengthen efforts to fully integrate Hong Kong and to further isolate Taiwan internationally.

The issues of Hong Kong and Taiwan are intimately linked for Beijing. Hong Kong was intended to be a model of effective unification under one country, two systems, to entice Taiwan to rejoin the motherland and bring to fruition the post-World War II rebuilding of China. But Hong Kong’s integration has grown increasingly fractious over the past decade, and this has reinforced sentiment in Taiwan that reintegration with China would see a similar erosion of Taiwan’s political and social structures.

With Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen’s reelection in January, driven in part by the Hong Kong protests, Beijing is aware that there is little support left in Taiwan for reintegration with the mainland. Rather, Taiwanese politics now splits between pro-status quo and pro-independence ideas. The COVID-19 pandemic has brought Taiwan’s international status back to the forefront, with countries from the United States to Australia arguing in favor of increasing Taiwanese participation in International forums like the World Health Organization, something strenuously objected to by Beijing.

The issues of Hong Kong and Taiwan are intimately linked for Beijing: Hong Kong was intended to be a model of effective unification to entice Taiwan to rejoin the motherland.

The 2019 protesters in Hong Kong rallied around five key demands, essentially insisting on self-determination for Hong Kong. This was clearly something on which Beijing would not yield. As protests continued, elements within the movement grew more violent, with some using improvised explosives, something Beijing fears Hong Kong security forces cannot fully manage. The combination of the college break and the social restrictions implemented due to the COVID-19 crisis eased the protests, but the Chinese National People’s Congress’ decision to take up the security law reignited them. While these protests were small, they demonstrated a growing willingness to challenge Hong Kong’s restrictions on gatherings and foreshadowed another summer of regular protest activity leading up to legislative elections in September.

The security law was supposed to be something Hong Kong itself passed following the 1997 handover from the United Kingdom, but domestic opposition delayed concrete action. Beijing has now stepped in to provide the legal tools to counter separatism, terrorism or intentional economic upheaval. The law will also provide a mechanism for Chinese agencies to operate directly in Hong Kong. The timing coincides with a delayed vote in Hong Kong later this week on a bill that would outlaw parodying or disrespecting the Chinese national anthem, another measure generating ire among Hong Kong protesters.

In the past year, China has grown more assertive in its international diplomacy, lashing out at anything it considers a challenge to Chinese national unity or criticism of Chinese actions. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated already-tense exchanges between China and several Western countries, but despite criticism and threats of political and economic sanctions, Beijing remains undeterred. The 100th anniversary of the CCP is an important piece of China’s narrative to reinforce Chinese nationalism and challenge what it sees as an outdated and unfair Western world order.

With rising international efforts to constrain China’s economic and political rise, Beijing cannot allow Hong Kong, a Chinese city, to remain a challenge to central authority. The politics of one country, two systems no longer resonate, and leaving Hong Kong to its own devices no longer aids China’s Taiwan policy. For Hong Kong, this means an acceleration of reintegration, and a more rapid erosion of special status — something that will likely trigger a further acceleration of corporate diversification or relocation from Hong Kong, challenging its status as a financial center. For Taiwan, it means increased economic and military pressure from the mainland. And for the world, it means China will use its political, economic and, if need be, military might to assert its sovereignty over its periphery, including Taiwan and the South China Sea.

Rodger Baker is the Senior VP of Strategic Analysis at Stratfor. He leads Stratfor’s strategic thinking on global issues and future trends.

Africa, International Organizations, Middle East, Security

Libya: From Civil War to Regional Conflict?

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A low-intensity civil war has been raging in Libya since after its 2011 revolution. The situation escalated in 2014 after Islamists ignored the results of parliamentary elections and forced the parliament and internationally recognized government to seek refuge in eastern Libya. That same year Khalifa Haftar, Commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) and loyal to the elected parliament, started a heavy-handed offensive to end an Islamist assassination campaign in Benghazi, the largest city in the east, where U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans were murdered two years before.

In 2015, the United Nations (UN) attempted to broker a deal, the Libya Political Agreement (LPA), focused on creating a new government. The LPA ultimately failed however because the negotiations were viewed as unrepresentative of actual power relationships on the ground. The internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), formed by the LPA, relocated to Tripoli in March 2016 and has been under the de-facto control of Tripoli and Misrata militias ever since. Libyans outside of the Tripolitanian area reject the GNA and continue to complain about the perceived unfair distribution of resources and wealth as well as the criminal enrichment of the militias in the capital region.

An LNA offensive on the Tripoli in April last year torpedoed a UN initiative for a Libyan National Conference in Ghadames after several failed initiatives to revive the doomed LPA. In the eyes of many across the country, Heftar purposely tanked the initiative his supporters deemed unbearable. For the GNA and its allies, on the other hand, he simply seeks to establish a military dictatorship.

The Main Warring Factions

The conflict is primarily between the GNA and Marshal Haftar’s LNA. As the GNA has very limited capabilities, it is supported by Burkan Al-Ghadab (BaG), which is both the name given to the counteroffensive (and translates loosely to Volcano of Rage) against the LNA  as well as the unofficial collective name for the anti-Haftar militias fighting for the government formed under the LPA. The BaG, strongly supported by Turkey and Qatar, is run by the Misrata militias, the largest single military block, and all of the major Tripoli militias. A larger number of radical Islamists including Al Qaeda (AQ) affiliates from the Tripolitania area fights among the ranks of the BaG, initially providing the backbone for several of its units. Several hundred Turkey-supported jihadists from Syria reinforced BaG early on in the battle for Tripoli. An alliance between the Misrata — Turkey’s closest allies in Libya and followers of Grand Mufti Sadeq Al Ghariani — and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), that has maintained a strong influence on politics, security, and the economy in Tripolitania over the years, maintains a dominating control over the GNA and BaG.

The core of the LNA are army units supported by various loosely connected militias. Its key foreign backers (and weapon suppliers) are Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The LNA has a very wide definition of terrorism, considering moderate Islamists and AQ affiliates, as well as the Islamic State (IS) alike, as terrorists. This approach has merged the usually disunited Islamists into a firm anti-Heftar block.

The civil war in Libya is now a war of attrition with belligerents who have very different capabilities. LNA casualties are mounting as it is no match for the state-of-the-art equipped Turkish troops in Libya. These troops maintain combat drones, electronic warfare capacities, long-range precision artillery, warships, and, most importantly, impressive air defense capabilities. As of 20 May, after retaking the last remaining LNA base in western Tripolitania, Al Wattiya, the BaG offensive has gained momentum while the LNA tries to consolidate its positions in the south of Tripoli.

An International Playground

Libya is a geostrategically important country holding Africa’s largest oil reserves. Naturally, several other countries have important and vital strategic interests there. Security-related interests are mostly concerned with the various Islamist groups, ungoverned areas, and Libya’s porous borders which allow for smuggling and human trafficking. Additionally, there are value-related interests focused on promoting either democracy or political Islam. Finally, several countries are economically interested in Libya’s valuable hydrocarbon industry. Between Libya’s regional neighbors (Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar) and concerned parties in Europe (namely Turkey, but also France, Italy, and Russia), all eyes are on the conflict between the LNA and GNA.

Turkey‘s troubled economy is in dire need of Libya as an important export destination and seeks a major share in reconstruction. The survival of the GNA and a leading role for Misrata are essential for Ankara’s economic interests. Turkey gives permanent residence to several prominent former LIFG leaders (a dormant former AQ affiliate), members of the Libyan MB, prominent former Benghazi and Derna Islamist fighters, and Libya’s Grand Mufti. Turkey uses their influence to pursue its interests in Libya. Qatar is also a major investor in Libya. Both Qatar and Turkey are providing weapons and military equipment for several of the pro-GNA militias, particularly those from Misrata. In fact, the Turkish military itself is the backbone of the war against the LNA.

Egypt, Libya’s neighbor, is closely watching the crisis across the border for any evidence of a terrorist safe haven developing so close to home. Libya is also an important labor market for almost one million Egyptians who cannot find work at home. Italy and France have significant strategic interests regarding Libya, but while, for Italy, the economy and migration are in the foreground, regional security and counter-terrorism are the French priority. For Moscow, the chaos in Libya is an opportunity to regain influence. Russia is most likely interested in getting a substantial share of the reconstruction business and influence over the hydrocarbon industry, particularly the gas market as well as establishing a “beachhead“ in North Africa. While there are no vital American national interests at stake in Libya, its instability is an increasing threat to US interests in the wider region.

Consequences of Developments on the Ground

After explosions significantly damaged the Misrata airbase on May 6, the LNA increased its efforts to achieve a breakthrough in Tripoli but is unable to make any progress. After the recent setback at Al Wattiya, and as Misrata airbase is fully operational again, the LNA will find it very difficult to maintain its remaining positions in Tripolitania without significant outside support from Egypt or the UAE.

Currently, there is no major BaG offensive operation east of Abu Grein – Wadi Zamzam, an area to the west of the oil-rich Sirte Basin. It is possible there is a tacit understanding between Turkey and Egypt that the BaG/Turkish offensive will stop short of Sirte and the central Al Jufra Oasis. However, keeping the significance of the hydrocarbon resources east of Sirte in mind, it is doubtful that such an agreement will hold. Furthermore, if the Cyrenaica separates from Libya as a consequence of the LNA defeat in Tripolitania, the Turkish-Libyan Maritime Agreement from November last year delineating their exclusive economic zones, an agreement of critical importance to Turkey, would become irrelevant.

If there is a military escalation between Ankara and Cairo over Libya, Egypt is in a much better position to provide direct logistic support without risk of interception. Fighter aircraft will be able to attack targets all over Libya directly from bases in western Egypt. Even ground forces could easily intervene if required, whereas Turkish transport aircraft, drones, or even fighters flying to Libya could be intercepted at ease.

If the LNA is defeated in Tripolitania, Turkey will become the dominant political and economic power in Tripolitania and Fezzan. This will have a huge negative impact on European strategic interests in Libya. It can be assumed that Turkey will become the favored economic partner of (western) Libya, strongly undermining the position of the various European stakeholders, in particular Italy and France. Turkey will also gain a more important position on the European gas market and will certainly be able to influence deliveries through the Green Stream pipeline that runs through Western Libya to Italy. Furthermore, Turkey will be able to control the pipeline’s central route towards Italy in addition to the eastern Mediterranean migration route to Europe. This will significantly increase Turkey’s ability to pressure the EU. Turkey will also probably continue to expand its political and economic influence towards Tunisia, Algeria, and the southern Sahara states. This includes support of political Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood and possibly some even more radical groups that will bring Turkey into conflict with vital French strategic interests.

A Civil or Regional War?

Libya’s civil war is home-made and its roots are domestic but it is not a typical proxy war. International support is key for both sides and will not end anytime soon. If one side loses its arms suppliers for whatever reason, the other would certainly prevail. No party trusts the other, efficient enforcement of the arms embargo is unrealistic, and Libya is simply too important. Regular demands for a “unified international position on Libya” or a “resolution between the two major parties” usually means unification of all efforts against the LNA. Keeping the deep rift within Libya and the strong interests from outside in mind, it is doubtful that such a “solution” has a chance to succeed.

Turkey’s President Erdogan is close to establishing facts on the ground by a combination of diplomatic and military action. The BaG is very likely to win the war as long as Turkish military capabilities in Libya are not neutralized and are able to sustain its efforts in light of mounting casualties and an eventual escalation in Syria. Egypt is hesitant to get fully involved in what could be a protracted and very costly conflict. Russia has limited capabilities and avoids even engaging the Turkish military in Syria directly and they are certainly hesitant to do so in Libya. 

A political settlement is currently much less likely than a military decision, but with the potential upcoming defeat of the LNA at Turkey’s hand, it will not solve Libya’s problems. In fact, the situation could easily escalate and lead to a regional conflict leaving Europe and the United States to learn to live with the outcome.

Wolfgang Pusztai is a freelance security and policy analyst. He was the Austrian Defense Attaché to Libya from 2007 to 2012.

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