Category Archives: Security

Europe, Security, Strategy

Strategy and Counter-Strategy: National Power in Ukraine

Nearly 30 days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it is clear the Kremlin has not achieved the quick victory it expected. Based on numerous invalid assumptions, the trigger for President Putin’s decision to invade was the perception of a window of opportunity. Virtually no one expected sustained Ukrainian military resistance. There are signs Russian planners actually thought some mixed Russian-Ukrainian soldiers would refuse to fight and that that the Russians in Ukraine – 40% of the population in the eastern Luhansk and Donetsk ‘oblasts’ – would welcome the Russian Army as liberators. Putin was not the only one fooled. Many in the West, who believed he would take the threat of sanctions more seriously, found themselves caught completely off guard by the invasion. Based on his past experience with the European Union (EU) and the United States however, Putin had no reason to expect anything other than symbolic sanctions, and certainly nothing that would impact the Russian economy as a whole. It’s likely he also believed leading European nations to be in a weak position to respond due to upcoming Presidential elections in France and a new Chancellor in Germany. 

Since then, sanctions against Russia have continued to mount and their impacts will accelerate over the coming months but it is not at all clear how long greater Europe can sustain them. While the Russians will not have a choice, European politicians fear the pressure of limited gas imports – and at least equally important – shortfalls of grain and meat supplies around the world. 

Russian Strategic Interests

Clear Russian strategic interests drive Putin’s objectives in the war for Ukraine. Most important is the vital interest to protect Russian minorities in eastern Ukraine and on the Crimean Peninsula and – eventually – those in Transnistria/Moldova. This is so important, the Putin regime would likely fall before Russia would be ready to accept the re-establishment of Ukrainian authority over these areas. Next is the re-establishment of a buffer zone between Russia and NATO on the Kremlin’s terms. Prior to the invasion, Putin believed that increasing integration with the European Union had removed Ukraine as a buffer with Europe if not NATO. The Russian plan to establish a dependent government in Kyiv in the first days of the war failed spectacularly and every day that passes erodes the legitimacy of any future Russia-installed replacements.*

The geostrategic advantages of the war include giving Moscow full control of the Sea of Azov and the northern Black Sea coast; both of which are necessary for the Kremlin’s least important though still critical interest: maintaining the area of the former Soviet Union as an area of influence. The Donbas, with its huge coal and iron ore deposits, was once the heart of heavy industry in the Soviet Union. Putin intends to once again tie the eastern Oblasts – and preferably the whole of Ukraine – to the Russian economy.  Though one might assume that maintaining the stability of the Russian economy is a vital Russian interest, it appears Putin has such a firm grip on Russian society that this is – currently – of lower priority. He certainly relies on the capacity of his own population to suffer in favor of the long-term development of the Russian economy as a whole. Lastly, it is becoming apparent that Putin’s personal center of gravity is the support of his security apparatus. Recent purges at Russia’s intelligence service (FSB) by the Federal Guard Service (FSO) suggest there are Ukraine war-related divisions within the state that required such action. Supervised directly by the President of the Russian Federation, this action by the FSO could reflect deep insecurities Putin has about his own power.

Volunteers flock to fight for Ukraine in pacifist Japan https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/around-70-japanese-have-volunteered-fight-ukraine-report-2022-03-02/
A civilian trains to throw Molotov cocktails to defend the city, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues, in Zhytomyr, Ukraine.

Use of the Instruments of National Power

Protecting these interests by achieving Russia’s stated objectives requires all its instruments of national power. Most obviously, the full-scale, heavy-handed military offensive against Ukraine will create its own reality on the ground. It will also, Putin hopes, deter a NATO response due to the threat of nuclear escalation. Though Russian military action is the primary inspiration behind the significant western response, it is the informational instrument of the Kremlin’s power that affects Russian citizens. The emphasis on the threat of Ukrainian “Nazis” against Russian minorities in the east and even against Russia itself justifies the military means by which Putin claims to safeguard the “motherland”. Meanwhile, Russian diplomats conduct ceasefire negotiations designed to undermine Ukraine’s will to resist and split public opinion. The longer the war drags on, the more Moscow will rely on diplomacy to secure as many of its strategic objectives as possible. Long a strong suit of Russian leaders, diplomacy could succeed where the military failed. Finally, Russia wields significant economic power over Europe through its gas supply but it is a double-edged sword. While both sides threaten to limit gas deliveries to Europe, they also race to harden their economies against these sanctions. In Russia’s case, alternative partners, such as China, promise to replace – at least in part – the EU and the US. Though the strategy has merit, the partial denial of access to the international financial system makes its implementation particularly difficult.

Counter-Strategy

The western center of gravity is now to maintain the wide rejection of the Russian aggression and support for the global sanctions regime. That said, Allied messaging has been less than ideal since the invasion began. NATO membership is not, nor has it ever been, a realistic option for Ukraine as it would have led to a very high risk of direct military confrontation with NATO. Admitting Ukraine to the Alliance after 2014 would have resulted in bringing Russian occupation forces into what was now NATO territory. Failing to rule it out publicly has only provided arguments for Putin’s recent propaganda. That is not to say that the West should give Putin a free hand. Unfortunate statements by the American President Joe Biden and some other Western politicians that NATO would not get involved militarily in Ukraine have convinced Moscow there is no military risk. Instead, NATO must focus attention on their efforts to support Ukraine. Enabling Ukrainian forces to sustain the war against Russia will do much to deter others (like China) from similar adventures. In this regard, the West has exceeded expectations. Assistance includes not only weapons deliveries (including deadly Stinger surface-to-air missiles and Javelin, Panzerfaust, and NLAW anti-tank missiles), but also logistics and extensive intelligence support. Ultimately, the combination of military assistance and comprehensive sanctions shall force Russia to end the war or at least prevent a further expansion of Russian influence beyond Ukraine by making it extremely costly to do so.

The effectiveness of Western sanctions and Putin’s ability to sustain the war are still open questions and America must urgently consider European economic independence from Russia and also China in some key economic areas.  More broadly, the West must strengthen international rejection of Russia’s invasion and account for its consequences for many Arab and African states that import an enormous portion of their grain, meat, and other agricultural products from Ukraine and Russia. In several countries there is already a significant increase in prices for consumers, while the stocks of provisions could run empty within a few short months. As seen during the lead up to the “Arab Spring,” this could have a huge destabilizing effect on these countries.  

*It is interesting to note that former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych might be Putin’s man of choice for a future Russia-friendly president. Yanukovych, a native of Donetsk, the largest city of the Donbas, was removed by the Parliament in February 2014 after massive street protests (“Revolution of Dignity”).

Wolfgang Pusztai is a freelance security and policy analyst. He was the Austrian Defense Attaché to Libya from 2007 to 2012. He has written several pieces for The Affiliate Network including Libya: From Civil War to Regional Conflict?

Foreign Policy, Politics, Security, Strategy

A Rocky Return To Multilateralism

Retracing the most impactful events of the past year has become a December tradition for readers familiar with The Affiliate Network. In a year that started with a violent – and nearly successful – attempt to overturn a US Presidential election, and is ending with a military standoff that could draw NATO into combat against Russia, it would seem to be difficult to find much more to talk about…But 2021 has been special for all the wrong reasons. Two years following the COVID-19 outbreak, political turmoil lingers around the world. Latin America regressed two decades in terms of extreme poverty; and the fight against supply-chain bottlenecks continues to hinder commerce globally. The response from the Biden Administration has been to return to multilateralism. They have explored the possibility of restarting the Iran nuclear deal, reclaiming leadership on climate change and Pacific trade, and have visibly strengthened alliances damaged by the previous administration’s transactional approach. There are signs however, that much of Biden’s multilateral tendencies are superficial, leaving us to wonder whether we are witnessing a rocky return to the status quo ante or if Trump left us with a new, less-cooperative, normal.

Biden kicks off first NATO summit with focus on China, Russia https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-kicks-first-nato-summit-plans-focus-russia-china-n1270645
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg speaks with President Joe Biden during a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of a NATO summit in Brussels, Monday, June 14, 2021.

Trade

Poised to become the world’s leading industrial power by 2049, China’s National People’s Congress released long-term objectives shortly following their centenary celebration in July. Central to these objectives is China’s “dual circulation strategy,” that will allow a balance of domestic demand and export markets to spur economic recovery since the outbreak of COVID. In the short term, dual circulation will integrate with the current Belt and Road Initiative. A good example of this integration is the Colombo Port City (CPC) in Sri Lanka. Through real estate development, business development, and technical outbound investment, China plans to launch CPC as a financial services center for South Asia. The strategy behind the project presents a challenge to the influence of the United States in Asia, a challenge that has been growing for decades. 

After four years of self-defeating hostility from the Trump Administration toward trade agreements, the White House is making superficial attempts to regain a place in the Indo-Pacific economic order. While on the surface this seems a repudiation of the previous administration’s trade policy, it is more a reflection of reality in the region. Despite the differences in tone, Biden has done little to advance climate goals or bolster the successor to the Trans-Pacific Partnership; the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TPP (CPTPP). In addition, the domestic indecision that mired US vaccine assistance earlier this year made it seem as or more cynical than the overt vaccine “diplomacy” practiced by China and Russia. On trade, climate, and the pandemic, the United States is struggling to lead and failing to find a way to make multilateralism work. On security, the situation is more complicated. 

Security

In September, US foreign policy concerns about China took on a distinctly military focus when the leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced the AUKUS security deal. In their piece: Collateral Impact: The Calculus of AUKUS, Travis Johnson and Lino Miani analyzed the potentially far-reaching impact of the trilateral agreement. The centerpiece of the deal was the provision of nuclear submarines to Australia which came at the expense of a similar arrangement with France. The French submarine deal had long been the subject of controversy in Canberra because it was estimated to be $70 billion over budget and had failed to deliver any significant capability in the five years since its inception. The subsequent outrage from Paris prompted discord between allies and put pressure on certain provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). An erosion of these accords leaves room for Chinese diplomacy to further divide the United States from its European allies in ways that are not directly connected to AUKUS. 

Any success or failure of AUKUS in the Indo-Pacific will be completely overshadowed by the drama of the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The last year of the Trump presidency featured an apparent drive for a deal with the Taliban at any cost. With little room to maneuver that didn’t just prolong the war, President Biden extended the Trump Administration’s May 1st deadline for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops but did nothing to advance a deal between Kabul and the Taliban. Ultimately the delay simply allowed America’s enemy of two decades to position itself for a takeover as American troops managed a desperate and devastatingly chaotic last stand at the airport. With the Taliban back in charge, America cut ties with Afghanistan and now sits on the sidelines while the Central Asian winter and an unfamiliarity with actual governance has rendered the Taliban unable to provide for millions while they consolidate their power.  

More worrying perhaps has been the unexpected and seemingly unprovoked escalation of tension in eastern Ukraine. A large Russian military buildup so alarmed Washington that President Biden spent the better part of a week in early December in virtual summits with NATO and other allied leaders and ultimately Russian President Vladimir Putin. The solidarity from NATO was effective at deescalating tension, at least temporarily, but must be viewed in light of intra-allied stresses caused by AUKUS and the US decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. Though it is not completely clear that Russia is deterred, Putin’s bold saber-rattling has succeeded in igniting a debate over the legitimacy of NATO expansion in the 1990s. The Kremlin’s seemingly outrageous demands would not have been outrageous in 1997. In 2021 Putin is pressing an advantage that only he can see. Whatever the eventual outcome of the crisis, Ukrainian membership in NATO is dead in the water. 

Alliances and the return of multilateralism represents the hallmark of 2021. Yet, strategy must not be cooperation for cooperation’s sake. NATO was founded in 1949 with the original purpose of ensuring that the core industrial, economic, and military regions of the world did not fall under the sway of a hostile power. The case of AUKUS is cut from the same cloth. Still, expansion should not be a substitute for long-term stability or diplomacy. Where Western sanctions against Russia have shown success, a similar military presence in Ukraine risks the threat of all out war. Ultimately, diplomacy, trade, and security must serve those willing to build and balance the peaceful international order. 

Travis Johnson is an active duty US Marine pursuing a MA degree in intelligence studies and is the associate editor for The Affiliate Network.

Asia, Foreign Policy, Politics, Security

Collateral Impact: The Calculus of AUKUS

The Biden Administration’s strategic shift toward evolving threats in the Indo-Pacific signals an attempt to reaffirm the balance of power there in Washington’s favor. In a short trilateral statement issued from the White House on 15 September, President Biden — with Prime Ministers Scott Morrison of Australia and Boris Johnson of the United Kingdom — announced an enhanced security partnership they call AUKUS. Despite its brevity, the AUKUS declaration supports a profound broadening of pre-existing defense relationships in the region by means of technological, scientific, and industrial collaboration across fields such as artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and cyber warfare. Though AUKUS was not explicitly aimed at the expansion of Chinese power, some clues about the agreement’s implementation cause most analysts — and certainly those in Beijing — to believe that it is. Regardless of how the messaging surrounding AUKUS is intended or received, it clearly has the potential to complicate Chinese designs in the region.

AUKUS sent a ripple that began in the South China Sea but surged heavily onto world capitals in East Asia and Europe. One heavily touted aspect of the pact is an agreement for the US and UK to provision the Royal Australian Navy with nuclear submarines; a capability that could radically curtail China’s economy in the event of a conflict. Though the submarine deal was presented as an economic move with military implications, Beijing dismissed any attempts at nuance as “extremely irresponsible” and stated the pact “seriously undermines regional peace and intensifies the arms race.” Still, considering the enormous expansion of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in recent years, including the development of multiple military outposts in the South China Sea and the expanding reach of the Belt and Road Initiative, some enhancement of regional maritime security seems necessary. 

In initial remarks certifying AUKUS, President Biden made clear distinctions between nuclear-powered subs and those armed with nuclear missile systems. This distinction would allow for the use of weapons-grade uranium, provided Australia initiates and adheres to additional strengthening of safeguards on the production, use, and disposal of highly enriched uranium (HEU). Safeguards provided by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) prevent nuclear warheads aboard the Australian submarine fleet and also restrict the use of naval HEU reactors. The move would make Australia the seventh country to field such assets and the very first non-nuclear weapons state to do so but also raises the concern that North Korea or Iran could obtain similar technology. Though it is not clear what specific contributions the US and UK will provide in terms of technology and HEU, this capability enables Australia to undertake a variety of operations far outside its territorial waters, putting pressure on the Chinese “nine-dash line” and complicating planning for Beijing. 

AUKUS proposes the development of similar nuclear-powered submarines for the purposes of the Australian naval fleet. https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Photo-Gallery/igphoto/2002371154/
(March 15, 2018) The Royal Navy hunter killer submarine HMS Trenchant (S 91) surfaces in the Beaufort Sea during Ice Exercise (ICEX) 2018. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication 2nd Class Micheal H. Lee/Released)

Collateral Effect

Though differences exist between the Trump Administration policy and Biden’s current focus on pragmatism, it is evident that countering the developing threat of China remains at the top of the bipartisan list of priorities. The same is true in the UK where critics of Boris Johnson initially hesitated to label him as a China hawk. However, by capitalizing on the 2007 decision to buy two aircraft carriers, their impact within the Pacific theater is a powerful reminder of “Global Britain.” In this respect, the US has effectively hardened the UK’s line on China. In Australia, the heavy-handed influence of Chinese interference is felt more strongly through cyber-attacks and state agents acting under the cover of Chinese journalists. While foreign policy must weigh necessary contingencies against the country’s developing trade, economic, and investment relations with its autocratic neighbor, stepping into commitments with AUKUS presents much more than a defensive posture. 

This expanding network remains most relevant in the 14-year-old Quad alliance consisting of Japan, Australia, India, and the US. As tensions continue to rise on all sides of China’s borders, the importance of the Quad is increasing tremendously. Taiwan regularly witnesses incursions of dozens upon dozens of military fly-overs, as do Japan’s nearby Senkaku Islands. Similarly, Indian and Chinese troops have repeatedly clashed in high-altitude tension in the Himalayas. Although critics are quick to write off these events as disparities common to the Indo-Pacific region, AUKUS offers more significant value given its intended depth. In addition to hardened physical boundaries, major strategies backed by the Quad and AUKUS have risen in importance over the past months as a counterforce to Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. Build Back Better World, or B3W, announced in June at the G-7 summit in Cornwall, U.K., aims to counter Chinese influence through massive investment in infrastructure development of developing countries by 2035. The expansion is led by the principles of the Blue Dot Network (BDN) which sets standards for transparency and environmental impact in infrastructure projects in low and medium-income countries across the world. Among G-7 member states, there is talk of AUKUS broadening to align its activities with that of Japan, although such cohesion remains to be seen. Ultimately, this network will solidify spheres of influence to an extent not witnessed in decades.

Pending Reprisal

The most profound outrage regarding the AUKUS alliance erupted not in the Indo-Pacific, but in France. French President, Emmanuel Macron, was not notified of the pact before it was announced. France’s unsurprising response expressed betrayal by two NATO allies and aggrievement at the economic losses to its lucrative submarine deal with Australia. Though the French arguments seem justified, there was notable dissatisfaction with the submarine deal which was estimated to be nearly $70 billion over budget. Though observers debate the righteousness of French outrage, the opportunity it presents for China to drive a wedge between NATO allies is certainly more important. Faced with what European leaders are calling a “stab in the back,” Beijing’s recourse to diplomatic vindication is not unexpected. Indeed, Chinese diplomats contend that France’s vision of “strategic autonomy” is code for avoiding over-reliance on America. If China can effectively present AUKUS as an erosion of the NPT, it could provide further leverage in their efforts to divide the United States from its European allies far beyond Paris and in ways that are not directly connected to AUKUS. 

President Biden’s apparent willingness to risk relations with France over AUKUS suggests a rearrangement of US security priorities back toward something that resembles the Obama Administration’s “pivot to Asia.” The extent to which this may justify the Elysee’s push for “strategic autonomy” will shape how well Washington can maintain a balance of power against China. For some, this balance is increasingly urgent. Michéle Flournoy conveys this sentiment more precisely in a Foreign Affairs essay in 2020: “It will take a concerted effort to rebuild the credibility of US deterrence in order to reduce the risk of a war neither side seeks.”

Lino Miani, CEO Navisio Global LLCTravis Johnson is an active duty US Marine pursuing a MA degree in intelligence studies and is the associate editor for The Affiliate Network. 

Lino Miani is a retired US Army Special Forces officer, author of The Sulu Arms Market, and CEO of Navisio Global LLC.