Category Archives: Europe

Strategy and Counter-Strategy: National Power in Ukraine

Nearly 30 days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it is clear the Kremlin has not achieved the quick victory it expected. Based on numerous invalid assumptions, the trigger for President Putin’s decision to invade was the perception of a window of opportunity. Virtually no one expected sustained Ukrainian military resistance. There are signs Russian planners actually thought some mixed Russian-Ukrainian soldiers would refuse to fight and that that the Russians in Ukraine – 40% of the population in the eastern Luhansk and Donetsk ‘oblasts’ – would welcome the Russian Army as liberators. Putin was not the only one fooled. Many in the West, who believed he would take the threat of sanctions more seriously, found themselves caught completely off guard by the invasion. Based on his past experience with the European Union (EU) and the United States however, Putin had no reason to expect anything other than symbolic sanctions, and certainly nothing that would impact the Russian economy as a whole. It’s likely he also believed leading European nations to be in a weak position to respond due to upcoming Presidential elections in France and a new Chancellor in Germany. 

Since then, sanctions against Russia have continued to mount and their impacts will accelerate over the coming months but it is not at all clear how long greater Europe can sustain them. While the Russians will not have a choice, European politicians fear the pressure of limited gas imports – and at least equally important – shortfalls of grain and meat supplies around the world. 

Russian Strategic Interests

Clear Russian strategic interests drive Putin’s objectives in the war for Ukraine. Most important is the vital interest to protect Russian minorities in eastern Ukraine and on the Crimean Peninsula and – eventually – those in Transnistria/Moldova. This is so important, the Putin regime would likely fall before Russia would be ready to accept the re-establishment of Ukrainian authority over these areas. Next is the re-establishment of a buffer zone between Russia and NATO on the Kremlin’s terms. Prior to the invasion, Putin believed that increasing integration with the European Union had removed Ukraine as a buffer with Europe if not NATO. The Russian plan to establish a dependent government in Kyiv in the first days of the war failed spectacularly and every day that passes erodes the legitimacy of any future Russia-installed replacements.*

The geostrategic advantages of the war include giving Moscow full control of the Sea of Azov and the northern Black Sea coast; both of which are necessary for the Kremlin’s least important though still critical interest: maintaining the area of the former Soviet Union as an area of influence. The Donbas, with its huge coal and iron ore deposits, was once the heart of heavy industry in the Soviet Union. Putin intends to once again tie the eastern Oblasts – and preferably the whole of Ukraine – to the Russian economy.  Though one might assume that maintaining the stability of the Russian economy is a vital Russian interest, it appears Putin has such a firm grip on Russian society that this is – currently – of lower priority. He certainly relies on the capacity of his own population to suffer in favor of the long-term development of the Russian economy as a whole. Lastly, it is becoming apparent that Putin’s personal center of gravity is the support of his security apparatus. Recent purges at Russia’s intelligence service (FSB) by the Federal Guard Service (FSO) suggest there are Ukraine war-related divisions within the state that required such action. Supervised directly by the President of the Russian Federation, this action by the FSO could reflect deep insecurities Putin has about his own power.

Volunteers flock to fight for Ukraine in pacifist Japan https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/around-70-japanese-have-volunteered-fight-ukraine-report-2022-03-02/
A civilian trains to throw Molotov cocktails to defend the city, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues, in Zhytomyr, Ukraine.

Use of the Instruments of National Power

Protecting these interests by achieving Russia’s stated objectives requires all its instruments of national power. Most obviously, the full-scale, heavy-handed military offensive against Ukraine will create its own reality on the ground. It will also, Putin hopes, deter a NATO response due to the threat of nuclear escalation. Though Russian military action is the primary inspiration behind the significant western response, it is the informational instrument of the Kremlin’s power that affects Russian citizens. The emphasis on the threat of Ukrainian “Nazis” against Russian minorities in the east and even against Russia itself justifies the military means by which Putin claims to safeguard the “motherland”. Meanwhile, Russian diplomats conduct ceasefire negotiations designed to undermine Ukraine’s will to resist and split public opinion. The longer the war drags on, the more Moscow will rely on diplomacy to secure as many of its strategic objectives as possible. Long a strong suit of Russian leaders, diplomacy could succeed where the military failed. Finally, Russia wields significant economic power over Europe through its gas supply but it is a double-edged sword. While both sides threaten to limit gas deliveries to Europe, they also race to harden their economies against these sanctions. In Russia’s case, alternative partners, such as China, promise to replace – at least in part – the EU and the US. Though the strategy has merit, the partial denial of access to the international financial system makes its implementation particularly difficult.

Counter-Strategy

The western center of gravity is now to maintain the wide rejection of the Russian aggression and support for the global sanctions regime. That said, Allied messaging has been less than ideal since the invasion began. NATO membership is not, nor has it ever been, a realistic option for Ukraine as it would have led to a very high risk of direct military confrontation with NATO. Admitting Ukraine to the Alliance after 2014 would have resulted in bringing Russian occupation forces into what was now NATO territory. Failing to rule it out publicly has only provided arguments for Putin’s recent propaganda. That is not to say that the West should give Putin a free hand. Unfortunate statements by the American President Joe Biden and some other Western politicians that NATO would not get involved militarily in Ukraine have convinced Moscow there is no military risk. Instead, NATO must focus attention on their efforts to support Ukraine. Enabling Ukrainian forces to sustain the war against Russia will do much to deter others (like China) from similar adventures. In this regard, the West has exceeded expectations. Assistance includes not only weapons deliveries (including deadly Stinger surface-to-air missiles and Javelin, Panzerfaust, and NLAW anti-tank missiles), but also logistics and extensive intelligence support. Ultimately, the combination of military assistance and comprehensive sanctions shall force Russia to end the war or at least prevent a further expansion of Russian influence beyond Ukraine by making it extremely costly to do so.

The effectiveness of Western sanctions and Putin’s ability to sustain the war are still open questions and America must urgently consider European economic independence from Russia and also China in some key economic areas.  More broadly, the West must strengthen international rejection of Russia’s invasion and account for its consequences for many Arab and African states that import an enormous portion of their grain, meat, and other agricultural products from Ukraine and Russia. In several countries there is already a significant increase in prices for consumers, while the stocks of provisions could run empty within a few short months. As seen during the lead up to the “Arab Spring,” this could have a huge destabilizing effect on these countries.  

*It is interesting to note that former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych might be Putin’s man of choice for a future Russia-friendly president. Yanukovych, a native of Donetsk, the largest city of the Donbas, was removed by the Parliament in February 2014 after massive street protests (“Revolution of Dignity”).


Wolfgang Pusztai is a freelance security and policy analyst. He was the Austrian Defense Attaché to Libya from 2007 to 2012. He has written several pieces for The Affiliate Network including Libya: From Civil War to Regional Conflict?

Back to Work: Risk Management in a Time of COVID

Due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, governments worldwide have opted to confine citizens to their homes. Forcing physical distancing among the population is a strategy of risk avoidance geared towards reducing the likelihood of the virus’ transmission.

In these uncertain times, when so-called “non-essential businesses” are banned from operating, small and medium companies must begin planning now for their eventual return to normal operation once confinement is over. Enterprises with limited resources must become familiar with the concepts of crisis and risk management; otherwise, they risk remaining permanently shut down.

After governments worldwide passed emergency legislation to stop the virus’ spread, companies came face-to-face with the new reality of confinement, which severely restricted operations and displaced employees. One day however, this quarantine will be over and workers will have to return to the workplace. Before this happens, all companies should develop a well-assessed and gradual return to normalcy introduced through phases.

Phase 1 – Observation

After weeks of confinement, citizens and businesses alike might react like a bull charging into the arena once the ban is lifted. Being deprived of simple freedoms like interacting with family and friends drives the desire for returning to normalcy. However, relaxing restrictions and a false sense of security from the viral threat will increase the likelihood of disease transmission. A rise in new cases will follow people as they return to work.

Risk management requires establishing an observation period of the disease’s impact on those wishing to return to work quickly. This observation period is necessary to monitor how the situation evolves as well as to analyze best practices from around the world. This phase should last at least two weeks (the estimated quarantine period for COVID-19) after the end of confinement enforcement.

Phase 2 – Kick-Off

Businesses should not attempt to return to regular operation without a proper mitigation plan in place, especially as staff return to shared workspaces. Companies have a duty to ensure their staff stay healthy and should, therefore, plan additional protective measures.

Evaluate and analyze multiple risks, identifying the most suitable treatment strategies to minimize the existing uncertainty. These strategies should consider (among other things): the number and type of staff physically returning to perform essential tasks; employees in specific risk groups (such as the elderly or those with pre-existing health conditions); and the returning staff’s willingness to share spaces. Managers should plan for shift work for selected staff; know how staff commute to work and develop plans to mitigate the risks of public transportation; and establish protocols for decontamination of public areas and use of personal protection equipment.  Managers should continuously review and draft new processes and operating procedures as the world learns more about this virus.

Phase 3 – Presence Escalation

A business’s most valuable resource is its staff and should avoid putting all of its assets at risk. As companies recover, gradually allowing employees to return while others continue to telework is a valuable strategy.

Additionally, preserving a clean working environment is more vital than ever. Any employee or third-party entering the workplace poses a risk of disease transmission and contamination. New standard operating procedures should include separate decontamination protocols for visitors and be strictly enforced. Social distancing inside the working environment should also be clearly defined and incorporated into these procedures.

Eventually, additional risk mitigation procedures, such as COVID-19 antibody tests that can indicate a person’s immunity to the disease, will be available to the general public. Until then, the above strategies will help prevent a resurgence of the disease as employees gradually return to work. This phase could take weeks or even months but should be completed before any return to full operational capacity.

Phase 4 – Long-Term Treatment

Western countries must enhance preventative measures and modify risk tolerance towards health crises. This means changing our social, cultural, and work habits, especially towards personal hygiene and proximity to others.

Most forecasting at the beginning of this crisis proved to be wrong or imprecise. It is difficult to forecast what may come in the next months, but health specialists believe a second, and even recurrent waves of COVID-19 infections could occur. We can only assume that access to tests and vaccines will be made available in the near term. However, we are not there yet, and other risk avoidance strategies must remain in place for now.

Proper planning for a return to normalcy is necessary as solidarity soars, and we prepare to weather this storm together.


Victor Perez Sañudo is a Law Enforcement Officer with over two decades of professional experience in security and risk management worldwide, having worked for the EU, NATO, OSCE and the United Nations in the five continents. Victor is certified Risk Management Professional C31000 by ISO 31000:2018 and certified Director of Security by the Spanish Ministry of Interior.

Why Russia Cannot Win

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